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Preface
Managerial and Organizational Cognition
If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. 
(Thomas and Thomas 1928)
This issue of International Studies of Management & Organization draws from pre-
sentations at a March 2005 European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management 
(EISAM) European Workshop held in Munich and from a related call for papers. 
The workshop was the eleventh on the theme of Managerial and Organizational 
Cognition (MOC). Since 1993, each has brought together scholars from around 
the world. Given their location, however, the workshops have helped develop a 
European perspective on MOC, a subject that became a distinct area of study in the 
1970s as a reflection and extension of a new field converging from related research 
in psychology, information systems, computer science, and other fields.
In the United States, MOC was supported by the formation of the Managerial 
and Organizational Cognition Interest Group in 1990, which later became a divi-
sion of the Academy of Management. Many European researchers were part of this 
group from the beginning, and a significant number are particularly interested in 
how practicing managers make sense of their worlds, as can be seen in this issue.
Around the world, the MOC field has always been split, and often confused, by 
interest in individual cognition, on the one hand, and attention to organizational 
cognition, on the other. “Thought,” often taken as the central subject of cognitive 
research, is clearly the product of individual minds, but there is a continuing de-
bate about whether it is helpful to see organizations as cognitizing, and this debate 
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is implicit in the papers that follow. Theoretical progress, recently reviewed by 
Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002), has been advanced by visual representations 
of managerial and organizational cognition, and this too is a uniting theme in the 
papers that follow. Many efforts to map cognition focused on causality. Researchers 
have been interested in providing a strong theoretical basis for the effort in cogni-
tive psychology (e.g., Eden 1988) as well as in other fields (Huff 1990, 2005), and 
both of us have been part of the pragmatic effort to record and analyze interview 
or written material from individuals and groups in organizations (e.g., Eden and 
Ackerman 2000; Huff and Jenkins 2001).
The papers in this issue add recent insight to enduring questions about what we 
can know about cognition and how that can be effectively represented. We selected 
four papers written by authors from Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and 
South Africa, which provide very different views of current research on managerial 
and organizational cognition—each with implications for both theory and practice. 
These contributions draw from different theoretical frameworks, and each provides 
insights into organizational context that might be used by a wide range of research-
ers interested in using a cognitive perspective.
Perhaps the most adventurous paper comes from work in Belgium conducted 
by Anne Wallemacq and Jean-Marie Jacques. As just noted, there have been many 
attempts to use maps as a representative surrogate for cognition. This paper goes 
beyond the words-and-arrows that characterize most previous maps to visually 
represent language as a semantic landscape. The work is based on a theoretic ap-
proach that provides a distinctly different way of understanding communication 
and meanings. The key idea is that “words define each other reciprocally, apart 
from their relations with some[thing] signified.” The excellent example the authors 
provide in the text is that “the management department” may signify a group of 
individuals in a given university, but the words can only be understood by noting 
how speakers use them with other signifiers, like “the economics department.”
Wallemacq and Jacques developed Evoq© software to capture these complexities. 
They propose that it is a “powerful tool for organizational analysis and diagnostic 
work in organizations and for the analysis of ideological processes.” Semantic 
fields are described as “a landscape, the ‘surrounding’ environment within which 
speakers move.” The emphasis is on differences or contrasts that inevitably convey 
similarities as well. There is a link to the large body of MOC research influenced 
by George Kelly, a psychologist, who also pointed to oppositions that help people 
understand the world around them (Kelly 1955).1 However, Wallemacq and Jacques 
make the distinctive point that “language is [not] a means of communication which 
the speaker masters completely. Speakers are constrained by language. They sculpt 
with words as sculptors work with resistant stone.” A very interesting aspect of 
Evoq© is that it allows researchers to deliberately explore alternative interpretations 
of language use, an agenda that is compatible with this fluid view of both cognition 
and communication.
We appreciate Wallemacq and Jacques’s concern for understanding and repre-
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senting meanings in context. This is a strength of most work in the cognitive field 
(see, for example, Eden, Jones, and Sims 1983), but most MOC research has a 
theoretical base in cognitive psychology. Wallemacq and Jacques are influenced 
by the writings of Derrida (1978, 1981, 1982) and other (post)structuralists. Their 
ideas are, therefore, more closely related to the sociology of defining the situa-
tion (McHugh 1968), with its implications for behavior, than to work rooted in 
psychology.
We are very positive about the breakthrough this paper suggests for work on 
managerial and organizational cognition, but there remains a puzzle about the 
certainty expressed by the authors in distinction to the epistemological argu-
ments made within the paper. The puzzle revolves around the firmness of views 
expressed by postmodernists, given the intrinsically ambiguous and relative world 
they describe. Nonetheless, this first paper is a powerful reminder of a continuing 
need to understand more about how speaking, language, and cognition are linked 
to behavior and acting. This is a serious hole in the cognition literature, which is 
addressed in this issue by Phyl Johnson.
The MOC literature has often raised the concern that what people say may 
not be what they “think” (see Eden 1992). Further, what is thought and perhaps 
said is often not a good predictor of behavior. Johnson suggests two reasons why 
researchers are often frustrated by weak links between their attempts to represent 
cognition and their ability to understand and predict surrounding behavior. The first 
is a curious inattention to emotion which, until recently, has not been researched in 
the general management literature or in more specific work on managerial cognition 
(an exception can be found in research reported by Daniels 1998).
Interestingly, in the first few decades, much of the research in our base discipline 
of cognitive psychology also ignored emotion, swayed by a computational model 
of how brains function. Johnson points out that emotion is now being given serious 
attention in psychology, where it “is considered not just in terms of a cognitive 
phenomenon but in terms of bodily sensations (feelings), [and] physiological re-
actions (tears).” Her helpful overview of research from a psychotherapeutic point 
of view also reminds us that some psychologists have always been interested in 
the link between emotion, action, and thought. Drawing especially on two recent 
books by Damasio (1994, 2000), Johnson suggests that “emotion must be seen as 
part of cognition,” and their “symbiosis” is needed to “account for the behavior 
of a collective.”
Discourse is the proposed focus for further study, as it both reveals and creates 
collectivity. An observation from Weick (2005) is often cited in the literature on 
managerial and organizational cognition: “How do I know what I think until I hear 
what I say.” Johnson’s paper questions this insight with references to psychology 
research that suggests conscious thought is not the driver that many cognitive 
researchers assume it is. Intriguing citations show that biological reactions often 
precede cognitive responses. By extension, Johnson contends that “information has 
been processed and choices made in our unconscious mind before our conscious 
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mind becomes aware of it.” She ends up agreeing with Freud (1900) and more 
recent psychologists who suggested that “intent is a post-rationalized fabrication 
that we have come to rely on as though it were real.”
We concur that the managerial literature has been curiously silent about both 
intent and emotion, and this is a plausible reason why the connection between 
representations of cognition and behavior is often so tenuous. Further, we accept 
the critique presented in this paper that almost all work on managerial cognition 
(including much of our own) has tended to accept verbal statements at face value. 
Johnson suggests a more sophisticated view, but we wish she had gone even farther 
to suggest methodologies for MOC researchers who want to move from assump-
tions about collective cognition to research on collectivity.
The final two papers in this issue study collectives while exemplifying two di-
rections for further research based on practical concerns. The first, by Annemette 
Kjærgaard, reports on a longitudinal study of an organization that was forced to 
change strategy due to declining revenues. The research explores the relative sta-
bility of cognition through the lens of organizational identity, which turns out to 
be a surprisingly stable concept.
Kjærgaard considers how organizational identity can dominate the cognition of 
organizational participants, even though they experience a continuing mismatch 
between their expectations and the actions of management. Her data suggest four 
ways that different staff make sense of this dissonance. The evidence is that orga-
nizational identity is not a stable set of constructs linked to a set of fixed behaviors, 
which early work on organizational identity tended to assume. Nevertheless, a 
pervasive organizational identity creates significant strategic inertia as it continues 
to guide the behavior of the staff even though management behavior relates to a 
new vision.
We are drawn to her metaphorical account of organization members describ-
ing themselves as moving from “thinking spaghetti” to “living lasagna,” but this 
paper, too, leaves room for further work. Figures from a single case study lead to a 
theoretical explanation that is temporally sequenced, but more evidence is needed. 
It is easy to criticize all case studies along these lines, yet surely the cycle can be 
entered at any point. What then can cognitive researchers say to those who want 
to shape intention in Johnson’s sense of the word?
The second empirical article, by Elaine Harris and Robin Woolley, reports on 
experiments with cognitive mapping as a means of negotiating consensus around 
what an innovating team does not know. The emphasis on uncertainty is a neat 
reversal of most cognitive literature to date, which tends to analyze what is known 
or what is assumed (often mistakenly from the researcher’s point of view). The 
Harris and Woolley paper takes action research seriously, with explicit tests of its 
adequacy using guidelines proposed by Reason and Bradbury (2000).
We wonder whether the tools used to generate consensus, along with the time 
pressures of the work being facilitated, might lead to false consensus. This kind of 
situation leads to Phyl Johnson’s suggestion that researchers and facilitators might 
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emphasize the deeper idea of “collectivity” over “group cognition.” Harris and 
Woolley reasonably might respond that pragmatic considerations preclude deeper 
alignment in many cases, and this response is worth considering by all those who 
are interested in managerial and organizational cognition.
In fact, all four papers presented in this issue provide timely food for thought 
on managerial and organizational cognition. Research is maturing, and there is a 
growing interest in application as well as moving theory forward. This issue shows 
interesting work being done in each domain and points toward a further agenda.
Anne SigiSmund Huff
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Note
1. For a useful overview of Kelly’s work, see Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002).
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